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This working paper is an outcome of the project on “Preferential Trading Agreements 
in Asia: towards an Asian Economic Community” being undertaken by ICRIER. The 
project is funded by the IDRC, Ottawa. On the basis of an empirical analysis, the 
paper establishes the economic rationale for a regional trading bloc in Asia that 
consists of ASEAN and four large Asian economies viz China, India, Japan and 
Korea, the so called ASEAN+4 arrangement. The findings of the empirical analysis 
suggest that India’s prior alignment with the ASEAN in the ASEAN+1 framework 
may be a more efficient or the least cost path to entering the ASEAN+4 bloc. This 
holds true for all the four major economies in forging their ties with ASEAN. The 
paper also highlights the possible adverse impact of the China-ASEAN free trade 
agreement (FTA) on India and identifies the sectors that are likely to be most affected 
by the implementation of the Early Harvest Programme of this FTA.  
 
The findings of the paper assume importance in the context of India’s ongoing efforts 
at regional integration and its vision of a Pan Asian FTA. I am confident that this 
paper will provide an important contribution in shaping India’s policy stance on 
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Abstract 
 
In this paper an attempt is made to evaluate the most efficient approach to regional 
economic integration in Asia. For the purpose, Asia is defined as inclusive of 
ASEAN, the plus three economies of China, Japan, Korea and India that is the 
ASEAN plus four. Given that ASEAN is an existing regional bloc in Asia, alternative 
approaches to the alignment of the plus four economies with ASEAN for the 
formation of the ASEAN+4 trade bloc have been evaluated to determine if there are 
efficiency costs by way of distortion in the patterns of trade away from those expected 
on the basis of comparative advantage. The findings of our analysis underscore the 
efficiency of a prior alignment with ASEAN for all the plus four economies.  
 
Key words: regional economic integration, Asia, efficiency cost, comparative 
advantage, first mover advantage, trade diversion. 
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   1
Asian Economic Integration
∗ 
ASEAN+3+1 or ASEAN+1s? 
 
1  Introduction 
The concept of an Asian economic community was first proposed at the Bali ASEAN 
summit in 2003. The concept has been taken forward in the East Asia Summit held in 
December 2005. At this summit ASEAN+3, India and Australia and New Zealand 
came together to deliberate on the evolution of an Asian Economic Community on the 
lines of the European Union (EU). These developments notwithstanding several 
initiatives are already under way towards achieving the objective of regional 
economic integration in Asia.  Among these are agreements between the ASEAN 
regional grouping and Japan (AJCEP), China (ACCEC), Korea
1 (AKCCP) and India 
(AICEC). The framework agreement has been signed for all these initiatives. A 
further initiative at forming a preferential trading arrangement in the region 
comprising ASEAN +3 is under discussion and is seen by many as the building bloc 
of a future East Asian Community (EAC). The EAC can then become the harbinger of 
the Asian Economic Community. 
 
Regional economic integration or preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) among 
economies in any region have however raised several concerns. A primary concern is 
if the PTA implies an efficiency cost and as a consequence undermines trade 
liberalization through the multilateral process. Given that a PTA accords preferential 
treatment to members vis a vis non- members there is always a possibility of trade 
being diverted away from non-members to members. On occasion when non-
members are more efficient producers this process of trade diversion will imply a cost 
in terms of denying both the producers and the consumers access to lower cost and 
more efficiently produced goods. A preferential trading arrangement therefore needs 
                                                 
 
∗ This works was carried out with the aid of a grant from the International Development Research 
Centre, Ottawa, Canada. The paper was presented at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy and 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore in August 2006. An earlier version of the paper was 
presented at the international workshop on “Preferential Trading Agreements in Asia: towards an 
Asian Economic Community” held in New Delhi in March 2006.  
 Research assistance by Raju Huidrom is thankfully acknowledged. 
1 In this paper Korea represents Republic of Korea.    2
to be evaluated to determine if there are efficiency costs by way of distortion in the 
patterns of trade away from those expected on the basis of comparative advantage. 
 
Having regard to this background of regional economic integration in Asia and the 
concerns raised on efficiency costs there is a need to undertake an analysis of the 
proposed new regional arrangement in Asia. Understanding the efficiency 
implications of the preferential trading arrangement will help policymakers in the 
participating countries to better prepare for and cope with economic integration in the 
region and evaluate the worth of the formation of future PTAs vis a vis multilateral 
liberalization. It is in this context that we set out the research agenda for this paper.  
 
As such an attempt is made to evaluate the most efficient approach to regional 
economic integration in Asia. For the purpose, we define Asia as inclusive of 
ASEAN, the plus three economies of China, Japan, Korea and India i.e. the 
ASEAN+4
2. Given that ASEAN is an existing regional bloc in Asia, alternative 
approaches to the alignment of the plus four economies with ASEAN for the 
formation of the ASEAN+4 trade bloc have been examined in terms of their 
efficiency costs. As a first step to our analysis, however, we establish the economic 
credentials of ASEAN+4 as a potential candidate for regional economic integration in 
Asia.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. A brief description of the sample period and data and 
review of previous empirical literature are given in Sections 2 and 3 respectively.  In 
Section 4 a detailed analysis of the trends in intra-regional trade of the ASEAN+4 
economies is undertaken to determine if there is a significant trade bias evident 
among the member countries. The index of trade intensity and the more sophisticated 
measures like trade bias and complementarity indices have been used to establish the 
case for ASEAN+4 as a regional trade bloc. The westward extension of ASEAN+3 to 
include India as an integral member of the ASEAN+4 is explained in Section 5. 
Alternative routes to Asian economic integration in terms of their economic efficiency 
are examined in Section 6. Efficiency is interpreted in terms of least cost of 
                                                 
 
2 The ASEAN-Australia &New Zealand Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement i.e. AFTA-
CER CEP has trade facilitation rather than trade liberalization as its agenda. Our analysis is therefore 
restricted to 14 of the 16 countries that were represented in the East Asia Summit in December 2005.   3
adjustment of a country’s production structure for participation in the preferential 
trading arrangement by itself as also against multilateral liberalization. The regional 
orientation index has been used jointly with the index of comparative advantage to 
analyze existing and potential inefficiencies in trade patterns. Costs that may have to 
be incurred by any of the plus four countries on account of trade diversion following a 
pre-emptive entry in ASEAN by any one country are estimated in Section 7. Section 8 
concludes with a presentation of the main findings of our analysis and their 
implications for shaping economic regionalism in Asia. 
 
2  Sample period and data 
The drive towards regionalism in Asia gained momentum only after the 1997-98 East 
Asian crisis. The reference period for the analysis in this paper is therefore 1999-
2003. For the purpose of comparison, where required, the analysis has also been 
undertaken for the period 1995-99. UNCOMTRADE based trade (export and import) 
data classified according to the Harmonized System (HS) at the 2 and 6-digit levels 
have been used for analysis.   
 
3  Previous empirical literature 
Several studies have examined the idea of regional economic integration in Asia. 
Most of these studies have focused on separate regions of ASEAN like North East 
Asia (the plus three economies of China, Japan and Korea) and the ASEAN+3. 
Mingqui (2003) has analyzed the ASEAN+3 region for economic integration. In his 
study Mingqui provides evidence of increased interdependence among the 13 
economies in the area of trade, capital flows and human resource mobility in support 
of economic integration in the region. ADB (2005) presents data indicative of the 
extent of trade and investment integration in Asia by sub-regions like East Asia and 
South Asia.  In the study East Asia is defined as the ASEAN 10 and the PRC, Japan, 
Hong Kong, China and Taipei, China. The extent of regional integration has been 
indicated on the basis of the intra-regional trade and investment shares and intensity 
measures.  A large number of studies, however, deal with the impact of trade bloc 
formation in terms of welfare and economic gains by undertaking ex post analysis 
using the gravity model e.g. Lee, Park and Shin (2004) and/ or an ex ante analysis   4
using CGE techniques
3. The most comprehensive study by Scollay and Gilbert (2001) 
highlights the small benefits associated with bilateral arrangements and points out the 
damage that some of them could inflict upon member and non-member nations.  
 
A systematic comparison or assessment of the many arrangements that have been 
proposed for economic integration in Asia has, however, not been undertaken so far. 
Studies on the efficiency of alternative regional arrangements or on the strategy of 
optimal sequencing of regional economic integration in Asia are missing. 
Furthermore, India does not find a mention in the limited number of impact studies 
undertaken for Asian FTAs. Even where options for economic integration of ASEAN-
East Asia that are inclusive of India are considered the focus remains on simplistic 
statements on India’s complementarities with East Asia in the services sector and the 
emerging trends of India’s competitive advantage as an outsourcing hub in the 
region
4. The focus of this study is at variance with issues discussed in the available 
literature as it aims at identifying the most efficient approach to the formation of a 
regional economic/trade arrangement in Asia that is inclusive of India. This is the first 
ever efficiency - based analysis of sequencing regional economic integration in Asia.  
 
4  The case for ASEAN+4 as a potential trade bloc 
4.1  The potential strength of ASEAN+4 
The ASEAN+4 region comprising two of the most dynamic economies in the world 
that is India and China is referred to as the ‘Arc of Advantage’. As may be noticed 
from the available facts presented in Table 4.1, the gross national income of the 
countries comprising this regional bloc is over US $ 7.6 trillion in 2003 and is 
comparable to the US $ 9.4 trillion gross national income of the EU. In terms of 
purchasing power parity, the national income of ASEAN+4 is US $ 16 trillion and is 
more than the national income of NAFTA which is US $ 13 trillion or of the EU 
which is US $ 11 trillion. The combined total reserves of this region are about US$ 2 
                                                 
 
3 For example Scollay and Gilbert (2001) and Yamazawa (2001) have estimated the potential effect of 
FTAs in North East Asia on welfare, trade and productivity. 
4 The strengthening of India’s linkages with ASEAN (5-in particular) finds a mention in Rajan and Sen 
in ADB (2005). The context however continues to be the ‘increasing complementarities in the 
services sector’.    5
trillion, and are much larger than that of the EU. Given that the proposed 14 country 
singular economic entity of ASEAN+4 has a 19 per cent share in total world trade 
which is almost as much as that of NAFTA and contributes 21 per cent of the global 
output and is in addition home to about half of the world’s population, it has the 
potential to impact the global as well as the regional economies.  
 
Table 4.1: ASEAN+4 Region: Summary Indicators 
ASEAN+4 NAFTA  EU 
Gross National Income (trillion US $)  7.60  12.50  9.40 
National income (trillion US $)PPP  16.00  13.00  11.00 
Population (billion)  3.03  0.42  0.45 
Total reserves (trillion US $)   1.60  0.25  0.52 
Share of world trade (%)  19.22  20.27  38.80 
Source: WDI, World Bank, 2005 
 
4.2  Trends in intra-regional trade 
The case for ASEAN+4 as a potential trade bloc in Asia is proposed on the basis of 
the encouraging trends evident in intra-bloc trade.  Intra-regional trade as a per cent of 
total trade at an aggregate level for the ASEAN+4 economies along with some 
selected blocs is shown in Table 4.2
5. Trade among the member nations of ASEAN+4 
as against their trade with the rest of the world registered an increase in the period 
1995-2003 even though there was a fall in 1999, possibly on account of the East 
Asian crisis.  In 2003 intra-bloc trade for ASEAN+4 was 44 per cent. This value of 
intra-regional trade share is higher than the corresponding share for many of the 
existing trade blocs in the year of their formation. For example, intra bloc trade for 
NAFTA was 42.1 per cent in 1994 and for Mercusor it was 12.9 per cent in 1991
6.   
 
Table 4.2: Intra-Bloc Trade (%) 
Regions 1995  1999  2003 
ASEAN 25.5  24.6  25.3 
ASEAN+4 42.0  39.5  44.0 
NAFTA 45.0  50.1  49.9 
                                                 
 
5 Data has been presented at four-year intervals to reduce the influence of any annual irregular 
variations such as those on account of fluctuations in commodity prices. 
6 Maurice Schiff and L. Alan Winters (2003).    6
It is also evident from Table 4.2 that the potential of ASEAN+4 as a candidate for 
regional economic integration is higher than that of the existing regional bloc in Asia 
that is ASEAN.  Intra-ASEAN trade is less than that for ASEAN+4. This fact is 
further corroborated when the trends for intra-bloc exports and imports shown in 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 are analyzed. There exists a positive difference between the levels 
of intra-bloc exports and imports for the proposed ASEAN+4 grouping as against the 
existing ASEAN. In 2003, intra-ASEAN trade– both exports and imports stood at 22 
per cent and this is much lower than the 35 per cent and 43 per cent of intra-
ASEAN+4 exports and imports respectively.  
 
Table 4.3: Intra Bloc Exports (%) 
Year 1995  1999  2003 
ASEAN 25.5  22.5  22.4 
ASEAN+4 35.2  31.1  35.0 
 
Table 4.4: Intra Bloc Imports (%) 
Year 1995  1999  2003 
ASEAN 17.5  21.8  22.0 
ASEAN+4 38.9  39.8  43.0 
 
Trends in intra-regional trade are therefore suggestive of the strength of the 
ASEAN+4 as a potential candidate for a regional bloc in Asia
7.This conclusion is 
further substantiated when the degree of ‘trade bias’ among member nations of the 
proposed bloc is evaluated using the index of trade intensity (TI).  As noted by Petri 
(1992), increases in intra-regional trade signify an increase in interdependence but do 
not give a strong indication of the ‘bias’ towards regionalization, as they may reflect 
changes in other variables, especially income growth. The growth in internal trade 
                                                 
 
7 A series of earlier papers like Wonnacott, Paul and Mark Lutz (1989), Summers, Lawrence (1991), 
Krugman (1993)  and Frankel et al (1995) argue that RTAs with larger pre–trade volumes and 
geographically proximate countries are likely to be welfare improving. Member nations of RTAs are 
referred to as ‘natural trading partners’ based on the criterion of the volume of trade. The volume of 
trade, may not, even though it is the most popular criterion, necessarily provide an objective measure 
of the extent to which the trading partners are ‘natural’ given that the volume of trade is itself 
affected by trade policy.   7
shares may, therefore, reflect income-induced changes in imports, rather than a rise in 
‘natural’ tendency to trade. To control this effect the TI index normalizes the bilateral 
or intra-regional trade shares according to the importance of the country or region in 
total world trade. The index of trade intensity with a value greater than one is 
indicative of higher bilateral trade than can be expected on the basis of the countries’ 
share in world trade. The change in the value of the index over time reveals if any two 
countries/groupings are experiencing an increased or decreased tendency to trade with 
one another.  An increasing value of the index is indicative of enhanced prospects for 
further integration while a decreasing value would suggest diminished prospects.  The 
TI index therefore, provides additional insights into the prospects for regional 
economic integration.  
 
Table 4.5 below summarizes the change in the TI index
8 at 3 time points
9 in our 
reference period. For a comparative picture the TI indices at the same time points are 
also shown for NAFTA. The TI index for ASEAN+4 clearly documents the increase 
in the concentration of trade within the region. The TI index as shown in Table 4.5 
exceeds unity for all the three time points in our reference period. This is indicative of 
‘intense’ trade relations within the ASEAN+4 regional grouping
10. The TI index for 
ASEAN+4 is comparable to that for NAFTA, particularly at the time of the latter’s 
coming into effect
11.  Trends in the index of trade intensity further confirm the claim 
of ASEAN+4 as a potential candidate for a regional trade bloc in Asia.  
 
Table 4.5: Intra-regional Trade Intensity Index 
                                                 
 
8 Intra-ASEAN Trade Intensity equals: (Intra ASEAN Exports/Total World Exports)/{(Total ASEAN 
Exports/Total World Exports)*(World Exports to ASEAN/Total World Exports)}: Kawai (2004) 
9 A limitation that is often cited of the TI index is that it fails to account for the distance between 
individual countries. Ng and Yeats (2003) have calculated the distance adjusted TI at a time point. 
The calculation of the TI over three different time points in our analysis should take care of this as 
bilateral distance remains constant over the period of time.  
10 Relative to ASEAN the TI index for ASEAN+4 that is inclusive of China, Japan, Korea and India is 
smaller in magnitude as the TI indices control for a region’s relative size in world trade. 
11 This corroborates earlier evidence in favor of the ASEAN+4. Intra-regional trade shares for 
ASEAN+4 in contrast with that of ASEAN are comparable to that for NAFTA at the time of the 
latter’s formation. 
Regions 1995  1999  2003 
ASEAN 3.9  4.5  4.4 
ASEAN+4 2.1  2.2  2.2 
NAFTA 2.4  2.3  2.7   8
While available trends on intra-ASEAN+4 trade establish the strength of the group by 
itself and relative to the existing bloc in Asia, that is, ASEAN for regional economic 
integration, there is a need to ascertain the relative positioning of India vis-à-vis the 
other three economies. The need to contextualize India in the proposed bloc becomes 
evident when we look at the share of each of the plus four economies in intra-
ASEAN+4 trade (Table 4.6). It is observed that India makes the lowest contribution to 
intra-regional trade (exports and imports) for the proposed trade bloc. In comparison 
with Japan that has the maximum share of 28 and 25 per cent in total regional exports 
and imports respectively in 2003, India’s share at about 2.0 and 3.0 per cent in exports 
and imports respectively is the lowest. 
Table 4.6: Share of the +4 Economies in Intra ASEAN+4 Exports and Imports (%) 
Countries  Share in Intra ASEAN+4 
Exports 
Share in Intra ASEAN+4 
Imports 
  1999  2003 1999 2003 
China 15.7  20.3 18.7 27.8 
India  1.4  2.0 2.9 2.8 
Japan 30.1  27.8 30.1 25.4 
Korea    14.2  13.5 12.9 12.8 
 
India’s alignment with ASEAN+4 is, however, justifiable on account of the rate at 
which its trade with India is growing relative to that with the plus three economies, 
increased share vis-à-vis other major trading blocs and partner countries in India’s 
total trade and the growing importance of India as a market for exports of ASEAN+4 
economies. We present evidence in support of India’s increasing trade linkages with 
the proposed bloc.  
 
5  The case for India in ASEAN+4 
5.1  Rate of growth of total trade with ASEAN+4  
The rate of growth of total trade of the plus four economies with ASEAN+4 is 
presented in Table 5.1. It is observed that the rate of growth of India’s total trade with 
ASEAN+4 over 1999–2003 is close to that of China and greater than that of Japan   9
and Korea. Among the plus four economies, India, registered the highest annual rate 
of growth of total trade with ASEAN+4 over the period 2001-2003. 
Table 5.1: Rate of Growth of Total Trade with ASEAN+4 (%) 
Year India  China  Japan  Korea   
1999/2000  -  3.2 33.0 28.3  31.2
2000/2001  11.4 5.4 -  9.5  - 11.8
2001/2002 24.8 21.9 5.3  13.2
2002/2003 37.3 37.4 20.6  23.8
Average annual rate of growth 9.5 12.7 3.0  5.3
5.2  Trade with ASEAN+4 vis-à-vis other regional blocs 
India’s trade with regional blocs presents an interesting picture (Table 5.2). In 1995, 
the EU (15/25) was the most significant trading bloc for India in terms of its share in 
total trade. Trade with the EU constituted 28 per cent of India’s total trade. This was 
followed by NAFTA at around 15 per cent and ASEAN at 8 per cent. In 2003, the 
share of EU in India’s total trade has fallen to 21 per cent and the share of the 
proposed ASEAN+4 bloc has increased to about 20 per cent
12. With its share in 
India’s total trade having increased to equal that of the EU, ASEAN+4 has emerged 
as the other dominant partner bloc for India.  
 
Table 5.2: Shares of Select Trade Blocs in India’s Total Trade (%) 
Year EU15 EU25 NAFTA  Mercosur  ASEAN  ASEAN+4  SAARC 
1995 27.4 28.0  14.9  0.8  7.8  18.1  2.9 
1999 23.5 24.0  15.2  1.1  8.5  17.5  2.1 
2003 20.2 20.7  12.9  0.9  9.3  19.9  3.4 
5.3  Trade with ASEAN+4 vis-à-vis Rest of the World 
India’s trade orientation towards the proposed trade bloc is also apparent when we 
look at the increasing divergence between the shares of ASEAN+4 and the rest of the 
world in India’s total trade. As is evident from Figure 5.1, there is a clear increase in 
the share of ASEAN+4 in India’s total trade at the expense of the rest of the world. 
                                                 
 
12 It may be noted that the share of ASEAN in India’s total trade has remained at about the same level 
over 1995-2003.   10
Over the period 2000–2003 the share of ASEAN+4 in India’s total trade has increased 
from 15 to almost 20 per cent and that of rest of the world registered a fall from 85 to 
80 per cent.  





As concerns individual member nations, three of the ASEAN+4 countries–China, 
Japan and Singapore feature among the top ten trading partners for India in 2003. 
Singapore and China first emerged among the top ten trading partners for India in 
2000 and have remained so since then. China has over the same period emerged as the 
third largest trading partner for India (Table 5.3).  
 
Table 5.3: India’s Top Ten Trading Partners  
Top Ten 2003  Share 2003 (%)  Top Ten 1995  Share 1995 (%) 
 USA  11.7  USA  13.7 
 UAE  5.0  Germany  7.5 
 China  4.9  Japan  6.8 
 UK  4.4  UK  5.7 
 Belgium  4.1  Belgium-Lux.  4.1 
 Germany  3.8  UAE  3.9 
 Hong Kong  3.3  Hong Kong  3.2 
 Japan  3.1 Italy  2.8 
 Singapore  3.0 Russian  Fed.  2.7 
 Switz.Leicht.  2.6  Saudi Arabia  2.7 
Note: Countries in bold and italics are members of ASEAN+4 
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5.4  India as a market for the ASEAN+4 
Simultaneous with the increase in the share of ASEAN+4 in India’s total trade it is 
observed that there is an increase in India’s relevance for the ASEAN+4 nations. 
Evidence shows that India is increasingly being looked at as a market for exports 
(Table 5.4). Over the years 1995-2003 India registered the highest rate of growth in 
the region for Chinese and Indonesian exports. India is second only to China as the 
most attractive market in the region for Korean, Malaysian and Thai exports.  
Table 5.4: India as a Market for ASEAN+4: A Comparison with the +3 Economies  
Markets Bru. 
Dar. 
China India Indon. Japan Korea Malay. Phili. Singap. Thai. 
CHINA -  - 86.7 13.1  17.9  31.6 27.6 -  29.7  27.5 
INDIA -  37.4 - 39.7  -    0.6  17.0  22.8 -  7.2  13.5 
JAPAN  -  12.1  -  2.6 1.2  -  6.1  2.2 -  0.6  2.3 
KOREA 
REP. 
- 22.3  7.7 5.4  1.3  -  5.3   9.6  11.0 
Notes: figures in the table represent average annual rog of exports to the specific markets over 1999-
2003. 
 
The fact that India is emerging as an important market for intra-regional exports is 
corroborated when we look at India’s trade with ASEAN+4. It may be seen from 
Table 5.5 that the average annual rate of growth of imports of India from ASEAN+4 
exceeds the rate of growth of India’s exports to ASEAN+4.  In addition, when 
compared with other plus four economies, the rate of growth of India’s imports from 
ASEAN+4 is second to China and significantly higher than that of Japan and Korea.   
 
Table 5.5: ROG of Exports and Imports of the Plus Four Economies: 1995-2003 
  India China  Japan  Korea   
Imports from ASEAN+4  10.8  14.6  4.4  4.8 
Exports to ASEAN+4  7.7  10.5  1.7  5.8 
 
To recap:  
 
•  Trends in intra-bloc trade reveal the strength of ASEAN+4 as a potential 
candidate for regional economic integration.  
•  Trends in index of trade intensity further substantiate the claim of ASEAN+4 as a 
regional trade bloc in Asia.   12
•  In the proposed trade bloc, though India’s share in total intra-bloc trade is the 
lowest relative to the plus three economies yet its alignment with the ASEAN+4 
bloc is justified on account of its growing trade linkages with the proposed bloc. 
 
Having noted the case for the justification for the inclusion of India in the proposed 
bloc of ASEAN+4, we analyze if India can be positioned in a manner similar to the 
plus three economies or if there are any features characterizing India that make it 
distinct from the other three economies and which may have implications for trade 
integration in Asia. For this purpose we undertake a comparative analysis of the trade 
bias towards the proposed bloc as exhibited by India and the plus three economies. 
 
6  India vis-à-vis the plus three economies 
It is observed that the share of trade with ASEAN+4 in total trade, exports and 
imports is far greater for the plus three economies than for India. In 2003, the share of 
ASEAN+4 in Korea’s total trade is 41 per cent, double the region’s share of 20 per 
cent in India’s total trade. Corresponding shares for China and Japan are 33 and 36 
per cent respectively. Similar trends are observed for exports and imports (Table 6.1).  
 
Table 6.1: Share of ASEAN+4 in Total Trade of the Plus Four Economies: 2003 
   India  China  Japan  Korea Rep 
Total Trade  19.9  33.2  36.2  41.2 
Exports 17.6  26.0  33.0  39.0 
Imports 21.7  40.9  40.2  43.6 
 
The TI index
13 further highlights the difference between India and the plus three 
economies vis-à-vis ASEAN+4. The TI index for each of the plus four economies 
with ASEAN+4 is presented in Table 6.2. The value of the TI index is close to 2 for 
all the plus three economies. This implies intense trade of these economies with 
ASEAN+4. In contrast the TI value of India with ASEAN+4 is yet to attain the value 
of unity. This suggests that unlike the plus three economies India does not at present 
reveal a marked trade bias towards the ASEAN+4. 
                                                 
 
13 Following Kojima (1964) and Drysdale (1969), the index of trade intensity is defined for country i’s 
exports to country j as the share of I’s exports going to j(Xij/Xi) relative to the share of j’s imports 
(Mj) in world imports net of I’s imports (Mw-Mi). That is, 
Iij=(Xij/Xi)/ Mj/Mw-Mi.   13
Table 6.2: Trade Intensity Indices with ASEAN and ASEAN+4 
   India Japan Korea    China 
1.2 2.4  1.9 0.9  1995 
0.9 2.1  2.0 1.7 
1.2 2.6  2.4 1.2  1999 
0.8 2.1  2.3 2.1 
1.7 2.4  1.8 1.1  2003 
0.9 2.2  2.1 1.7 
Numbers in italics and bold are TI indices for ASEAN+4 
 
Clearly then, even though India’s trade relations with ASEAN+4 are growing and 
doing so at a rate higher than that for any of the other plus four economies, the   
magnitude of trade as also the intensity of trade are not yet comparable with that of 
any of the plus three economies. This trend is borne out by our calculations of the 
bilateral trade bias index (BI). The BI
14 measures the average influence of relatively 
low or high resistances to individual commodity trade between one group of countries 
and another as compared with the latter’s trade with the rest of the world. A BI index 
with a value greater than unity indicates a positive influence or bias while a value less 
than unity measures a negative influence. The bias indices shown in Table 6.3 present 
the picture of India’s differential position among the plus four economies even more 
vividly. Given that the value of the index is less than unity, India’s trade bias is not 
yet as intense as or comparable with that of the plus three economies’ towards the 
ASEAN+4.  
 
Table 6.3: Index of Trade Bias  
Numbers in italics and bold are Bias indices for ASEAN+4 
 
                                                 
 
14 The BI has been calculated at the aggregate trade level and sector level for this paper. However 
calculation of the BI is laborious as it involves the matrices of bilateral trade by commodity unlike 
for the TI index. Given that Iij=Bij*Cij (Drysdale, 1982) the intensity index is more informative at 
lower costs and provides the same information as the Bias index if Cij does not change much over 
the reference period.  This is true of our data as Cij remains close to/ equal to unity all along the 
reference period of this study.     
   India China  Korea  Japan 
1.9 1.2  1.8 2.7  1995 
0.8 2.0  2.0 2.6 
2.0 1.7  2.3 3.4  1999 
0.8 2.4  2.2 3.1 
2.2 2.0  1.9 3.0  2003 
0.9 2.1  2.3 3.5   14
So, India’s trade with ASEAN+4 increasing at a rate greater than that of any of the 
plus three economies and its increasing importance as a market for ASEAN+4 
provides the basis for accepting India as an integral part of ASEAN+4
15. However, 
the share of the proposed bloc in the plus three economies’ total trade is far greater 
than and more intense relative to its share in India’s total trade. So a de facto market 
led integration of the plus three economies with ASEAN (the ASEAN+3)
16 is evident. 
In the ASEAN+4 set of countries India thus stands out as the ‘distant’ economy. For a 
trade bloc comprising the ASEAN, China, Japan, Korea and India it is therefore 
imperative that the path of integration for the ‘distant’ economy be identified. 
Considering that the index of trade intensity and bias is greater than unity for India-
ASEAN trade over 1995-2003
17  we suggest that India should enter the ASEAN+4 by 
first aligning with ASEAN in an ASEAN+1 arrangement. This may happen through 
either of the following two options
18:  
 
a.  ASEAN+1s: India’s alignment on a plus one basis combined with all the plus 
three economies also entering through a plus one arrangement. A convergence of 
all the ASEAN+1 agreements will lead to the emergence of ASEAN+4; or 
b.  ASEAN+3+1: As stated above the ASEAN +3 already exists as a de facto market 
led arrangement. India enters last through the ASEAN+1 route to constitute 
ASEAN+4. 
 
We evaluate these two routes in terms of their efficiency costs using a two part 
methodology which is explained below. 
 
                                                 
 
15 India’s trade intensity index with ASEAN+4 is less than one for aggregate trade. However when a 
sector-wise TI index is calculated it is greater than one for sectors like agriculture and allied 
commodities, minerals and mineral fuels and more recently in the chemicals and plastics sector. This 
is borne out by our calculations of the sector-wise CI and BI indices. This therefore supports our 
earlier inference on India’s justified alignment with ASEAN+4. Results of sector-wise BI, CI and TI 
index are presented in the Appendix –Tables A.1-A.3.     
16 ASEAN+3 has been referred to as the most suitable candidate for East Asian regionalism in the 
literature (Baldwin, 2006; Drysdale, Peter 2001). At this stage the ASEAN+3 group is not a regional 
trading agreement. The focus in ASEAN+3 is on financial cooperation.   
17 See Tables 15 and 16. 
18 Note that for the plus three economies the TI and BI in Tables 15 and 16 indicate equal bias towards 
the existing and proposed bloc.   15
7  The most efficient route to ASEAN+4: ASEAN+3+1 or the ASEAN+1s?  
7.1  Regional orientation and comparative advantage 
To estimate the efficiency costs associated with alignment of the plus four economies 
with ASEAN we examine if the additional trade that is generated on account of the 
anticipatory effects of the proposed/under negotiation/signed preferential 
arrangements is primarily in products in which these countries reveal comparative 
advantage in the global market. The analysis will allow us to infer if additional trade 
and increased export dynamism is in products where the plus four countries have low 
enough costs to be competitive in the world market. If this does not hold true then the 
comparison suggests that the additional trade within the respective markets/trading 




The investigation is undertaken using two indices - the index of revealed comparative 
advantage (RCA)
 20 and the regional orientation (RO) index. The RO index conveys 
useful information about change in geographic patterns of trade as it takes the ratio of 
the share of a product in exports to the region to the share of the product in exports to 
third countries
21. Both the index of RO and RCA are calculated at the 2-digit level of 
HS classification and for ASEAN+4 and ASEAN as target markets. As such, direct 
comparisons of the two indices provide an indication of the extent to which trade 
orientation towards ASEAN+4 and ASEAN distorts trade patterns based on 
                                                 
 
19 The issue is essentially whether RTAs foster ‘high cost’ imports at the expense of ‘low cost’ ones. 
The traditional calculations of trade diversion based on import data infer this from the displacement 
of imports from non-partners by those from partners, implicitly comparing partner and non-partner 
costs by their relative competitiveness in the pre-RTA regional market. In this section we follow the 
supplementary view as developed in Yeats (1997) where inference about ‘high’ and ‘low’ costs is 
made by implicitly comparing the relative competitiveness of partner and non-partner goods in world 
markets.  
20 The index of Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) is calculated as 
RCAj = [xoj/Xto] / [x*wj  ÷ X*w].100 where x*wj  and X*w  represent world (ASEAN) exports of 
product j and total world exports respectively. xoj and  Xto represent country exports of j to world 
(ASEAN). 
21 The regional orientation (RO) index is defined as:  
Rj = [xrj / Xtr]/ [xoj /Xto].100  
where xrj and xoj represent the value of exports of j to ASEAN and to ROW, respectively and   
Xtr and Xto reflect the total value of the country’s exports to ASEAN and outside the arrangement.    16
comparative advantage in the global market
22 for each of the plus one economies. 
Efficiency costs are measured as the percentage of sectors in which the economy is 
getting increasingly oriented towards the respective region over 1995-2003
23 even 
though it is not competitive in these sectors in the global market. In other words we 
identify the percentage number of sectors which satisfy the following criterion.  
 
(RO2003 - RO1995) > 0 & RO2003 > 1 and   RCA2003 < 1 
 
in two target markets- ASEAN and ASEAN+4 
 
The results of our analysis are presented in Table 7.1. The efficiency costs are lower 
 
Table 7.1: Efficiency Costs*: Regional Orientation and Comparative Advantage 
   ASEAN ASEAN+4 
India 50.0  53.6 
China 26.1  66.7 
Japan 90.9  85.1 
Korea   68.3  77.5 
*% number of Sectors 
 
for alignment with ASEAN relative to ASEAN+4 for all the economies except Japan. 
For China the cost of alignment with ASEAN is low relative to alignment with 
ASEAN+4 and lowest among the plus four economies. In comparison with about 67 
per cent for ASEAN+4 only 26 per cent sectors are such that despite being 
comparatively disadvantageously placed in the world market China’s exports from 
these sectors are getting increasingly oriented towards ASEAN. For India, in about 50 
per cent of the sectors increased export orientation towards ASEAN is observed 
despite a lack of comparative advantage in the world market in comparison with 54 
per cent such sectors in case of ASEAN+4. Corresponding figures for Korea are 68 
and 78 per cent for ASEAN and ASEAN+4 respectively. Clearly, ASEAN+1 is a 
more cost efficient arrangement for all the economies except Japan
24.  
                                                 
 
22 An attempt has also been made to do the same for the rest of the world market or the Non-ASEAN 
world. The results are not significantly altered.   
23 The change in RO index is calculated over a period of time as it conveys only limited information 
about trade patterns if computed for a single point in time.  Inter-temporal comparisons over 
relatively short periods provide useful information on the way the geographic pattern of trade is 
changing.     
24 As an alternative to this strict efficiency criterion if costs are calculated as percentage number of 
sectors that are increasingly getting oriented towards the target market-ASEAN or ASEAN+3 but   17
7.2  Efficiency costs vis-à-vis multilateral liberalization 
7.2.1  Alignment of comparative advantage  
In this section we estimate the efficiency costs by undertaking a comparison of the 
comparative advantage of each of the plus four economies in the ASEAN+4/ASEAN 
market and the world market. Alignment of the structure of a country’s comparative 
advantage in the two markets (ASEAN and world or ASEAN+4 and world) will 
imply fewer shifts in the production structure and lower costs as a consequence of an 
FTA with either ASEAN+4 or ASEAN. In addition, we have also compared the RCA 
across the three markets cross classified by factor intensity. The analysis will provide 
evidence of a shift, if any, of the factors of production, between industries that may be 
required as a consequence of regional integration. The efficiency costs as estimated in 
this section will also be indicative of the cost of participation in the regional FTA 
relative to participation in multilateral liberalization which, according to conventional 
wisdom, is considered the ‘first best’ solution for attaining the potential benefits of a 
more open world economy.   
 
The index of RCA has been calculated at HS-6 digit level for the most recent year of 
our sample period that is 2003
25. The alignment of RCAs has been checked using the 
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient (SRCC) at the aggregate level (for all sectors) 
and separately for agriculture, manufacturing, minerals and fuels, chemicals and 
plastics and manufactures chiefly by materials and miscellaneous manufactures
26. The 
SRCC, a non-parametric test, is often used to test for independence between two 
random variables. The range of possible values is from –1 to +1. A value close to +1/-
1 will be interpreted to mean strong positive/negative rank correlation while a value 
of zero indicates a complete lack of correlation. For the purpose of our analysis, a 
                                                                                                                                            
 
experiencing a fall in comparative advantage in the world market i.e. (RO2003  - RO1995) > 0 & 
(RCA2003 - RCA1995) < 0 alignment with ASEAN emerges as the lower cost and hence more efficient 
option for all the plus four economies. The results are reported in the Appendix Table A.4.         
25 As the arrangements are yet to fructify we calculate efficiency costs using the most recent year 2003 
as indicative of future costs.  
26 The alignment of the structure of comparative advantage has been undertaken irrespective of the 
value of the index. Alternately alignment of only those commodities where countries are 
comparatively advantageously placed has also been tried. The results do not alter the earlier 
implications.    18
high
27 rank correlation will be interpreted to mean the ranking of a country’s 
industries by comparative advantage in a particular market, in this case, ASEAN or 
ASEAN+4 is similar to its ranking in the global market. A low coefficient will 
indicate that the ranking is considerably different across the two markets. The former 
implies lower cost of alignment with the respective preferential arrangement vis-à-vis 
the multilateral participation. The results are presented in Table 7.2.  
 
Table 7.2: Alignment of Comparative Advantage vis-à-vis Multilateral 
Liberalization 
   India China  Japan Korea 
0.66 0.72  0.73 0.63  All Sectors 
0.73  0.84  0.79 0.78 
0.63 0.60  0.59 0.55  Agriculture & Allied 
0.74  0.81  0.67 0.74 
0.67 0.74  0.72 0.63  Manufacturing 
0.73  0.85  0.78 0.78 
0.64  0.44  0.68  0.48  Minerals & Mineral Fuels 
0.82  0.85 0.89  0.78 
0.70 0.75  0.65 0.67  Chemicals & Plastics 
0.75  0.86  0.73  0.82 
0.69 0.74  0.71 0.61  Manufacturers chiefly by Mat. 
0.74  0.83  0.79 0.77 
0.55 0.72  0.76 0.65  Machinery           
0.57 0.82  0.84  0.79 
0.38 0.85  0.73 0.60  Misc (HS 90-99) 
0.50  0.85 0.82  0.75 
Note: Italicized: ASEAN+4; Bold: Moderate; pink: high: All others: Low; All significant 
 
The value of the coefficient of SRC is fairly high at the aggregate level and for 
individual sectors for all economies. As against multilateral liberalization, 
participation in either of the two arrangements, that is, ASEAN+4 or ASEAN, does 
                                                 
 
27 While no strict definitions are available we specify the range of 0-0.4 as low, 0.5-0.7 as modest and 
0.8 and above as high for the SRCC.    19
not imply significant shifts in the comparative advantage and, consequently, in the 
production structure. The extent of alignment is slightly higher at the aggregate level 
for all the economies for the ASEAN+4 market.  
7.2.2  Alignment of comparative advantage and shifts in factor intensity 
Five categories of factor intensity (FI) are identified. These are primary, unskilled - 
labour intensive, natural - resource intensive, human-capital intensive and technology 
intensive. The export patterns of the economies reclassified according to these five 
categories are compared across markets-world and ASEAN and world and 
ASEAN+4-for alignment using the SRCC. The results, presented in Table 7.3, are 
interesting. The value of the coefficient varies across countries but again falls in the 
range of being classified as modest to high, with very few in the latter category. India 
stands out as distinctly different from the other plus three economies. The export 
structure is aligned broadly similarly in ASEAN and world and ASEAN+4 and world 
for India. The value of the SRCC is almost the same in the two target markets. This 
implies an indifference between alignment with ASEAN or ASEAN+4 for India as 
neither implies any major shift of factors from their current employment in industries 
as oriented towards production for the global market. For the plus three economies 
ASEAN+4 is marginally more efficient than ASEAN.  
 
Table 7.3: Alignment of Comparative Advantage and Shifts in Factor Intensity 
   India China  Japan  Korea 
0.71 74  0.72  0.65  Human-Capital Intensive 
0.75  0.82  0.79 0.78 
0.65 0.55  0.62  0.57  Primary 
  0.77  0.82  0.77 0.79 
0.62 0.66  0.71  0.60  Unskilled-Labour Intensive 
0.68 0.75  0.78  0.75 
0.71  0.62  0.75 0.60  Natural-Resource Intensive 
0.75 0.77  0.80  0.77 
0.64 0.72  0.71  0.66  Technology Intensive 
0.67  0.85  0.79  0.81 
Note: Italicized: ASEAN+4; Bold: Moderate; pink: high All others: Low;  
 
 
To consolidate our results efficiency costs in terms of a shift in factor intensity has 
been analyzed using another approach. The number of commodities for which a 
country enjoys comparative advantage in each market has been counted in each FI   20
category. A comparison is undertaken to see if there are major numerical differences 
across the global and regional markets. If true, it will imply shifts of the factors of 
production from one category to another and this displacement of factors may involve 
costs. The results are presented in Tables 7.4 and 7.5. We observe a broad alignment 
of comparative advantage in terms of factor intensity for the plus four economies in 
the world and ASEAN/ASEAN+4 markets. India has maximum comparative 
advantage revealed in unskilled-labor-intensive commodities, followed by 
technology-intensive and human-capital-intensive in that order–both in the world 
market and ASEAN/ASEAN+4 market. In general, India’s revealed comparative 
advantage in ASEAN/ASEAN+4 is in line with that in the global market. The 
numbers in ASEAN and ASEAN+4 are more or less similar and distinct differences 
or patterns are not evident. No major costs are anticipated on account of alignment 
with either of the preferential arrangements vis-à-vis the global market. The results 
are on similar lines for the plus three economies. 
 
Table 7.4: Shifts in Factor Intensity: % Count of Products: ASEAN 
Factor Intensity  India  China  Japan  Korea  
Human-Capital 
Intensive 
19.5 22.1 18.3 18.7 21.7 23.8  23.5  24.2
Natural-Resource 
Intensive 
6.2 6.3 5.0 6.1 6.5 8.7  6.6  7.3
Primary 15.1 17.3 10.1 10.5 3.9 5.2  7.0  6.8
Technology Intensive  21.4 22.2 25.8 28.0 47.0 42.1  31.8  29.1
Unskilled-Labour 
Intensive 
32.4 25.3 36.4 31.7 10.8 10  25.5  26.8
Un-Classified 5.5 6.8 4.4 5.1 10.1 10.2  5.6  5.8
Total No. of Products  1511 996 1826 1898 1178 1163  859  865
Bold and Italicized: ASEAN; Otherwise: World 
 
Table 7.5: Shifts in Factor Intensity: % Count of Products: ASEAN+4 
Factor Intensity  India  China  Japan  Korea  
Human-Capital 
Intensive 
19.5 20.5 18.3 17.9 21.7 23  23.5  23.9
Natural-Resource 
Intensive 
6.2 5.8 5.0 6.6 6.5 6.6  6.6  6.0
Primary 15.1 17.1 10.1 13.4 3.9 4.6  7.0  8.9
Technology Intensive  21.4 21.7 25.8 24.5 47.0 37.5  31.8  24.7
Unskilled-Labour 
Intensive 
32.4 28.9 36.4 32.9 10.8 19.8  25.5  31.1
Un-Classified 5.5 6.0 4.4 4.7 10.1 8.4  5.6  5.4
Total No. of Products  1511 1114 1826 2084 1178 1527  859  1354
Bold and Italicized: ASEAN+4; Otherwise: World   21
 
Based on the above analysis of efficiency conditions it is considered that India’s entry 
into the ASEAN+4 trade bloc will be more efficient if made through an ASEAN+1 
arrangement. For China and Korea also the ASEAN+1 framework will be the more 
appropriate route. While the ASEAN+4 is marginally more efficient vis-à-vis 
multilateral liberalization, costs of regional orientation of exports are lower for both 
Korea and China in an alignment with ASEAN in the ASEAN+1 arrangement. 
Alternative calculations of efficiency costs give a similar inference for Japan also. A 
convergence of the plus one initiatives of all the plus four economies with ASEAN 
may therefore be the more efficient route to achieving regional economic integration.  
 
8  If ASEAN+1: is there a first mover advantage? 
If Asian economic integration is to be achieved through a convergence of the 
ASEAN+1 initiatives it is necessary that we analyze if a pre emptive entry to ASEAN 
by any of the plus four economies will give it a first mover advantage vis-à-vis the 
other economies. Context and sequence of events is important in evaluating a 
preferential trading arrangement. The ASEAN-China FTA triggered a positive 
domino effect in the region. First, Japan followed suit by submitting a similar 
proposal and soon India and Korea also followed. The late entrants–Japan, India and 
Korea may face export diversion on account of China being the first mover for FTA 
formation with ASEAN. This is particularly relevant as the Early Harvest Programme 
of the ASEAN-China framework agreement is already in implementation and the 
FTA itself will be the first to be effective. In this section we examine if China‘s prior 
entry in ASEAN has an adverse impact through trade diversion on the other three 
economies. The degree to which each country is affected through trade diversion will 
depend critically on how much overlap there is between the exports of these 
countries
28. Empirical analysis of the trade diversion effect of the ASEAN-China FTA 
on partners in the Asian FTA has not been undertaken so far. We undertake an 
analysis of the export similarity of the plus four economies using conventional 
                                                 
 
28 Unlike the econometric analysis of trade diversion and trade creation effects of the PTAs using the 
gravity model and general equilibrium techniques this exercise enables us to distinguish the trade 
diversion effects at the commodity level. Commodities/product groups where India is most 
threatened on account of trade diversion as a consequence of the China-ASEAN FTA are thus 
identified in this paper.       22
techniques and, in addition, introduce innovations by evaluating the existing and 
potential overlap of comparative advantage of the plus four economies at the sector 
and commodity levels. 
8.1  Export Overlap 
First, an evaluation of the degree of overlap of exports of the plus four economies has 
been undertaken by a simple analysis of export composition. The observations thus 
made are substantiated using the statistical technique of Spearman Rank Correlation 
Coefficient (SRCC). The SRCC is calculated for exports both at the 2 and 6-digit HS 
level for India, China, Japan and Korea to ASEAN in 2003. As a check of the 
robustness of the results, the above exercise using correlations is repeated using a 
separate and equally popular export similarity technique known as the Finger–Kreinin 
Index (F-KI)
 29.  
 
The analysis of export composition reveals that there is very little similarity between 
the exports of India and the other three economies to ASEAN. At the 2-digit level 
(Table 8.1), we find that there is only a moderate export overlap between India and 
China, Korea and Japan. High overlap is indicated for exports of Korea with Japan. 
The export overlap between Korea and Japan is in fact the highest. The risk of trade 
diversion due to being left out or as a late entrant to the ASEAN would therefore not 
be particularly high for India. The risk of trade diversion is high for Korea vis a vis  
 
Table 8.1: Export Similarity of the +4 Economies in ASEAN: 2003.  (HS 2 digit) 
   India  China  Korea  Japan 
India -  0.6  0.6  0.5 
China -  -  0.7  0.6 
Korea Rep.  -  -  -  0.8 
Japan -  -  -  - 
                                                 
 
29 The FKI estimates the export similarity by calculating the relative importance of various 
commodities in the export structure of pairs of countries and then using a filtering technique, that is,  
S = ∑i min([Xia/ ∑Xia ], [Xib/ ∑Xib]) 
Where i =trade by disaggregated commodity 
a, b=two countries 
The first ratio is the share of commodity I in country a’s total exports and the second is the share of 
commodity i in country b’s total exports. If these ratios are equal then the ratio in our formula would 
sum to one, indicating perfect similarity. On the other hand, if they are totally different, the formula 
would be zero. The index can thus range from 0 to 1.    23
Japan. The results of the SRCC calculations at the 6-digit level of dis-aggregation 
presented in Table 8.2, however, allay the fears of trade diversion for all the four 
economies. The value of SRCC is low and, therefore, indicative of a negligible export 
overlap between the plus four economies reinforcing further our conclusion that the 
risk of trade diversion for a late entrant is low as is the first mover advantage. 
 
Table 8.2: Export Similarity of the +4 Economies in ASEAN: 2003.  (HS 6 digit) 
   India China  Korea    Japan 
India -  0.4  0.3  0.2 
China -  -  0.4  0.4 
Korea Rep.  -  -  -  0.5 
Japan  -  - - - 
* Significant at all levels 
 
The F-K index is estimated at the 2 and 6-digit level of disaggregation for India, 
China, Japan and Korea. The results are given in Tables 8.3 and 8.4. At the 
commodity level (HS-6 digit) the value of the index is small, thus corroborating the 
evidence on the SRCCs of the export structure of the plus four economies to ASEAN. 
The extent of competition between the plus three and India in the ASEAN market is 
almost non-existent.   
 
Table 8.3: Finger-Kreinin Index: ASEAN (HS 2 digit) 
     India   China   Japan   Korea  
1995 -  0.50  0.34  0.44  India  
2003 -  0.46  0.36  0.44 
1995 0.50 - 0.50  0.58  China  
2003 0.46 - 0.67  0.71 
1995 0.34  0.50 -  0.71  Japan  
2003 0.36  0.67 -  0.81 
1995  0.44 0.58 0.71  -  Korea  
2003  0.44 0.71 0.81  - 
 
Table 8.4: Finger-Kreinin Index: ASEAN (HS 6 digit) 
     India   China   Japan   Korea  
1995 -  0.24  0.15  0.15  India  
2003 -  0.27  0.16  0.18 
1995 0.24  - 0.33 0.26  China  
2003 0.27  - 0.31 0.43 
1995 0.15  0.33 -  0.27  Japan  
2003 0.16  0.31 -  0.46 
1995 0.15  0.26  0.27  -  Korea  
2003 0.18  0.43  0.46  -   24
As the scope for trade diversion on account of export similarity of the plus four 
economies to ASEAN+4 is almost negligible, the ASEAN+1 arrangement can be 
perceived as an efficient vehicle to achieve regional economic integration in Asia.   
8.2  Overlap of comparative advantage 
For greater robustness of our results we also examine the extent of overlap in 
comparative advantage that each economy enjoys in the ASEAN market at present or 
is likely to enjoy in the future. Two sets of commodities are identified.  
i)  Overlap of existing comparative advantage: The first set comprises 
commodities for which more than one of the plus four economies currently 
enjoys comparative advantage in the ASEAN market.  
ii)  Potential for overlap of comparative advantage: The second set comprises 
commodities for which the plus four economies can in future develop 
comparative advantage in ASEAN as they are currently advantageously placed 
in the world market.  The potential possibility for exports of these 
commodities to ASEAN would be lost/threatened on account of one of the 
plus four economies making a prior entry into the ASEAN market.  The threat 
is more real if one of the plus four countries is at present the main country of 
origin of imports of these products for ASEAN.   
8.2.1  Overlap of existing comparative advantage 
Among the plus four economies maximum overlap of existing comparative advantage 
in the ASEAN market is observed between India and China. For 52 per cent of the 
commodities where India and China have an advantage in the world market as well as 
in ASEAN, India enjoys greater comparative advantage relative to China in the 
ASEAN market. Indian exports of these commodities are likely to be adversely 
affected if China makes a prior entry in ASEAN. Trade will be diverted away from 
India. Further, for 72 per cent of these commodities, India is actually more 
competitive than China even in the world market. Among these are commodities like 
marine products (fish and mollusks) and leguminous vegetables that belong to sectors   25
1-8 (HS classification)
 30. Tariff concessions have been offered on these commodities 
under the Early Harvest Programme (EHP) of China’s FTA with ASEAN. India is, 
therefore, negatively affected through trade diversion on account of the 
implementation of the EHP of China’s FTA with ASEAN. In the longer run when the 
ASEAN-China FTA is fully implemented the maximum number of products that are 
likely to suffer export diversion belongs to the cotton sector. Commodities like cotton 
sewing thread, plain weave cotton, cotton yarn, twill weave cotton, and woven fabric 
of cotton may suffer maximum export diversion. The advantage that China may get 
on account of an FTA may render it cheaper for ASEAN to import these commodities 
from China, in which case there is trade diversion from India and in addition 
efficiency loss for ASEAN.  This implies that there is a cost to staying out of the 
ASEAN arrangement for India on account of China’s pre emptive entry in ASEAN. 
For Japan and Korea, on the other hand, the extent of trade diversion is greater vis-à-
vis each other’s entry in ASEAN rather than with respect to China’s entry in ASEAN.   
8.2.2  Potential for overlap of comparative advantage 
As the threat of export diversion for India is evidently the highest from China, the 
potential for overlap comparative advantage is analyzed for India vis-à-vis China 
only.  The set is defined as commodities that ASEAN imports and where India 
currently enjoys comparative advantage in the world market and is either more or 
equally advantageously placed relative to China. It is interesting to note that even 
though at present China is not as advantageously placed in the world market as India, 
it is the main source of ASEAN imports. In these commodities India has a potential 
for developing comparative advantage in ASEAN as it is already far more 
advantageously placed than China in the world market. A set of 19 such commodities 
is identified. Of these 19 commodities – seven or 37 per cent belong to product groups 
like textiles, manmade filaments and footwears and gaiters that are intensive in 
unskilled labour (Table 8.5). The ASEAN-China FTA will further intensify exports of 
these commodities from China to ASEAN and simultaneously prevent India from 
                                                 
 
30 A complete list of products where India is comparatively more advantageously placed in both the 
world and ASEAN market is provided in Appendix (Table A.5). 
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exploiting its potential for exports to ASEAN. China’s entry in ASEAN prior to India 
through the ASEAN- China FTA thus also implies potential trade diversion for India.    
 
Table 8.5: Commodities with Potential for Overlap of Comparative Advantage 
between India and China in the Unskilled labor Intensive Category 
HS Code  Product 
520543  Cotton yarn,>/=85%,multi,combed,232.56 >dtex>/=192.31,nt put up,nes  
540262  Yarn of polyester filaments, multiple, nes, not put up                                  
550999  Yarn of other synthetic staple fibres, not put up, nes                                    
560750  Twine, cordage, ropes and cables, of other synthetic fibres                         
560900  Articles of yarn, strip, twine, cordage, rope and cables, nes                         
630710  Floor-cloths,dish-cloths,dusters & similar cleaning cloths,of tex mat          
640420  Footwear with outer soles of leather and uppers of textile materials            
 
9  Conclusions 
In this paper alternative approaches to the alignment of the plus four economies with 
ASEAN for the formation of the ASEAN+4 trade bloc have been examined in terms 
of their efficiency costs. On the basis of an analysis of the trends in intra-regional 
trade the study establishes the strength of ASEAN+4 as a potential trade bloc in Asia. 
Evidence on India’s increasing trade linkages with ASEAN+4 is used to justify 
India’s inclusion in the regional trade bloc. The share of the plus four economies 
reveals a de facto market led integration for the ASEAN+3. India stands out as the 
‘distant’ economy in this set of countries. It is imperative therefore that any proposal 
for regional economic integration in Asia that is inclusive of India should focus on the 
optimal route for India’s integration into the trade bloc.  
 
Our results show that a prior alignment with ASEAN in the ASEAN+1 framework 
may be a more efficient or least cost path to entering the ASEAN+4 bloc for all the 
plus four economies. The costs of aligning with ASEAN in the plus one framework 
are lowest for China. Regionally oriented export patterns do not imply any significant 
costs of adjustment of the production structure or shift of factors of production away 
from those that are consistent with the orientation towards the global market. A 
convergence of the plus one initiatives may therefore be a more efficient route to   27
achieving regional economic integration. This is also the more practical path to the 
emergence of an ASEAN plus four regional bloc as even though the ASEAN 
initiatives with China, Japan, Korea and India maybe seen as leading the region 
towards an economically integrated whole they are as yet within the framework of the 
ASEAN+1 agreements and ASEAN negotiates with each country separately. 
 
Efforts will however need to be made within the region to ensure that the ‘ASEAN+1’ 
agreement can act effectively as a stepping stone to an ‘ASEAN+4” agreement. Only 
if the ASEAN+1 agreements of the plus four economies are compatible with each 
other would there be hope of linking these agreements to constitute a regional 
economic entity in Asia in future.   Compatibility is possible as the elements of the +1 
agreements are still being negotiated. A greater focus on harmonization and 
consistency within ASEAN is required-say for e.g. with respect to the rules of origin 
that at present may be scattered and inconsistent with one another.   
 
Finally, in case China makes a pre-emptive entry into ASEAN, which it is bound to 
considering that the Early Harvest Programme (EHP) is already in effect and the FTA 
will be the first to be implemented, India, among the plus four economies, will be the 
most adversely affected due to trade diversion. The EHP of the ASEAN-China FTA 
that offers tariff concessions on commodities of sectors 1-8 (HS) will have a negative 
impact on India. Products like marine products - fish and molluscs and leguminous 
vegetables are likely to suffer. In the longer run when the ASEAN-China FTA is fully 
implemented the maximum number of products that are likely to suffer export 
diversion in India belongs to the cotton sector. Commodities like cotton sewing 
thread, plain weave cotton, cotton yarn, twill weave cotton, and woven fabric of 
cotton may suffer maximum export diversion. In the long run the ASEAN-China FTA 
may also limit India’s export potential in ASEAN in product groups like textiles, 
manmade filaments and footwears and gaiters that are largely unskilled labor 
intensive commodities. It is imperative therefore that India should hasten its process 
of negotiations for an early conclusion of the India-ASEAN FTA. For Japan and 
Korea trade diversion is expected to be greater vis a vis each other’s entry in ASEAN 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1:  India: Sector -wise Trade Intensity Index with ASEAN+4 
Sectors  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Agriculture  &  Allied  1.4 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.3 
Minerals & Mineral 
Fuels 
1.3 1.3 1.2 1.7 1.6 0.6 0.6 1.6 1.7 
Chemicals & 
Plastics 
0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 
Manufacturers 
chiefly my Materials 
0.7 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 
Machinery  0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.6 
Misc.  0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.3 1.0 1.1 
 
Table A.2: India: Sector-wise Complimentarity Index with ASEAN+4 
Sectors 1995  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  2002  2003
Agriculture  &  Allied  1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Minerals & Mineral 
Fuels 
1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 
Chemicals & 
Plastics 
1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Manufacturers 
chiefly by Materials 
1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Machinery  0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 
Misc.  0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 
Aggregate  1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 
 
Table A.3: India: Sector-wise Bias Index with ASEAN+4 
Sectors 1995  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  2002  2003
Agriculture  &  Allied 1.14 1.20 1.04 0.95 0.99 0.97 1.20 1.18 1.12 
Minerals & Mineral 
Fuels 
0.98 0.91 0.87 1.25 1.44 0.46 0.44 1.22 1.40 
Chemicals & 
Plastics 
0.82 0.92 0.90 1.18 1.26 1.03 1.10 1.28 1.23 
Manufacturers 
chiefly by Materials 
0.62 0.54 0.47 0.49 0.56 0.55 0.62 0.70 0.55 
Machinery  0.78 0.77 1.05 0.82 1.40 1.31 1.17 1.19 0.97 
Misc.  0.52 0.57 0.65 0.81 0.61 0.94 1.68 1.10 1.92 
Aggregate  0.75 0.74 0.69 0.69 0.80 0.75 0.86 0.92 0.88 
 
Table A.4: Efficiency Costs*: Alternative Calculations 
   ASEAN ASEAN+4 
India 33  38 
China 51  75 
Japan 18  42 
Korea Rep.  44  58 
*% number of Sectors   31
Table A.5*: Overlap of Existing Comparative Advantage: India and China 
Sl. No  HS Code  Product 
1  030379  Fish nes, frozen, excluding heading No 03.04, livers and roes                             
2  030799  Molluscs nes,shelld o not&aquatic invert nes,fz,drid,saltd o in brine                   
3  071390  Leguminous vegetables dried,shelled,whether or not skinnd or split,nes              
4  090240  Black tea (fermented) & partly fermented tea in packages exceedg 3 kg              
5  100630  Rice, semi-milled or wholly milled, whether or not polished or glazed                
6  120220  Ground-nuts shelld,whether or not broken,not roastd or otherwise cookd            
7  150810  Ground-nut oil, crude                                                                      
8  151550  Sesame oil&its fractions whether/not refind,but not chemically modifid             
9  250820  Decolourising earths and fuller 
10  251400  Slate, whether or not roughly trimmed or merely cut etc                                    
11  282120  Earth colours cntg 70%/more by wght of combind iron evaluatd as Fe2O3         
12  290342  Dichlorodifluoromethane                                                                    
13  290490  Derivs of hydrocarbons cntg mixtures of sulpho,nitro or nitroso groups              
14  290611  Menthol                                                                                    
15  292142  Aniline derivatives and their salts                                                        
16  292143  Toluidines and their derivatives; salts thereof                                            
17  292221  Aminohydroxynaphthalenesulphonic acids and their salts                                    
18  293319  Heterocyclic compds cntg an unfused pyrazole ring in the structure,nes              
19  293626  Vitamin B12 and its derivatives, unmixed                                                   
20  293942  Pseudoephedrine (INN) and its salts                                                        
21  294190  Antibiotics nes, in bulk                                                                   
22  320412  Acid and mordant dyes and preparations based thereon                                      
23  320415  Vat dyes and preparations based thereon                                                    
24  320417  Synthetic organic pigments and preparations based thereon                                 
25  320641  Ultramarine and preparations based thereon                                                 
26  380810  Insecticides, packaged for retail sale or formulated                                       
27  401120  Pneumatic tires new of rubber for buses or lorries                                         
28  401390  Inner tubes of rubber nes                                                                  
29  401511  Gloves surgical of rubber                                                                  
30  401691  Floor coverings and mats of rubber exc cellular and hard rubber                         
31  410429  Bovine and equine leather, tanned or retanned, nes                                         
32  420100  Saddlery and harness for any animal, of any material                                       
33  481610  Paper, carbon or similar copying, nes                                                      
34  500600  Silk yarn&yarn spun from wilk waste,put up f retail sale;silk-worm gut              
35  500720  Woven fabrics of silk/silk waste,o/t noil silk,85%/more of such fibres                
36  500790  Woven fabrics of silk, nes                                                                 
37  520411  Cotton sewg thread >/=85% by wght of cotton,not put up for retail sale              
38  520522  Cotton yarn,>/=85%,single,combed, 714.29 >dtex>/=232.56, not put up            
39  520523  Cotton yarn,>/=85%, single, combed, 232.56 >dtex>/=192.31, not put up          
40 520541  Cotton  yarn,>/=85%,  multiple, combed,>/=714.29 dtex, not put up, nes              
41  520811  Plain weave cotton fabric,>/=85%, not more than 100 g/m2, unbleached            
42  520821  Plain weave cotton fabrics,>/=85%, not more than 100 g/m2, bleached               
43  520831  Plain weave cotton fabric,>/=85%, not more than 100 g/m2, dyed                       
44  520912  Twill weave cotton fabric,>/=85%, more than 200 g/m2, unbleached                  
45  520921  Plain weave cotton fabric,>/=85%, more than 200 g/m2, bleached                      
46  520941  Plain weave cotton fabrics,>/=85%, more than 200 g/m2, yarn dyed                   
47  520959  Woven fabrics of cotton,>/=85%, more than 200 g/m2, printed, nes                    
48  521122  Twill weave cotton fab,<85% mixd w m-m fib,more than 200 g/m2,bleachd  
49  550922  Yarn,>/=85% of polyester staple fibres, multiple, not put up, nes                        
50  551012  Yarn,>/=85% of artificial staple fibres, multiple, not put up, nes                        
51  551299  Woven fabrics,containg>/=85% of other synthetic staple fib,o/t unbl/bl              
 
Cont’d….  32
Sl. No  HS Code  Product 
52  551313  Woven fab of polyest staple fib,<85% mixd w/cot,</=170g/m2,unbl/bl,nes        
53  551592  Woven fabrics of oth syn staple fib,mixd w/wool o fine animal hair,nes              
54  551644  Woven fabrics of artificial staple fib,<85% mixed with cotton,printed                
55  570299  Carpets of other textile materials, woven, made up, nes                                    
56  570310  Carpets of wool or fine animal hair, tufted                                                
57  610120  Mens/boys overcoats, anoraks etc, of cotton, knitted                                       
58  610442  Womens/girls dresses, of cotton, knitted                                                   
59 610831  Womens/girls  nightdresses  and  pyjamas, of cotton, knitted                                 
60  620422  Womens/girls ensembles, of cotton, not knitted                                             
61  620442  Womens/girls dresses, of cotton, not knitted                                               
62  620443  Womens/girls dresses, of synthetic fibres, not knitted                                     
63  620453  Womens/girls skirts, of synthetic fibres, not knitted                                      
64  620630  Womens/girls blouses and shirts, of cotton, not knitted                                    
65  620821  Womens/girls nightdresses and pyjamas, of cotton, not knitted                            
66  620891  Womens/girls panties, bathrobes, etc, of cotton, not knitted                               
67  621142  Womens/girls garments nes, of cotton, not knitted                                          
68  621430  Shawls, scarves, veils and the like, of synthetic fibres, not knitted                     
69  621440  Shawls, scarves, veils and the like, of artificial fibres, not knitted                     
70  630311  Curtains,drapes,interior blinds&curtain or bed valances,of cotton,knit                
71  630391  Curtains/drapes/interior blinds&curtain/bd valances,of cotton,not knit                
72  630492  Furnishing articles nes, of cotton, not knitted or crocheted                               
73  630520  Sacks and bags, for packing of goods, of cotton                                            
74  630790  Made up articles, of textile materials, nes, including dress patterns                     
75  640320  Footwear,outr sole/uppr of leathr,strap across the instep/arnd big toe                  
76  681260  Asbestos paper, millboard and felt                                                         
77  701610  Glass cubes&oth glass smallwares backd o not for mosaics o decor purp.           
78  711790  Imitation jewellery nes                                                                    
79  720110  Pig iron,non-alloy,containg by wght </=0.5% phosphorus in primary form         
80  720890  Flat rolled prod, i/nas, not further worked than hot rolled, nes                           
81  721790  Wire of iron or non-alloy steel, nes                                                       
82  732394  Table,kitchen or oth household art&parts thereof,i or s,enamelled,nes                 
83  732591  Balls, grinding and similar articles of iron or steel, cast for mills                      
84  732599  Articles of iron or steel, cast, nes                                                       
85  732619  Articles of iron or steel, forged or stamped, but not further worked                     
86  741532  Screws, bolts and nuts of copper excluding wood screws                                    
87  741700  Cookg or heatg apparatus,domestic,non-electric&parts thereof of copper            
88  761410  Stranded wire,cables,plaited bands,etc,alum,steel core,not elect insul                  
89  820190  Scythes,sickles&other hand tools used in agriculture,horticulture etc                  
90  820310  Files, rasps and similar tools                                                             
91  820411  Wrenches, hand-operated, with nonadjustable jaws                                           
92  820510  Drilling, threading or tapping tools                                                       
93  820570  Vices, clamps and the like                                                                 
94  821290  Parts of non-electric razors                                                               
95  821490  Kitchen chopper,cleavers & mincing knives & other articles of cutlery               
96  843041  Boring or sinking machinery nes, selfpropelled                                             
97  844841  Shuttles for weaving machines (looms)                                                      
98  871493  Bicycle hubs and free-wheel sprocket wheels                                                
99  901600  Balances of a sensitivity of 5 cg or better with or without weights                       
100  960810  Ball point pens                                                                            
*Note: Products where India is more advantageously placed than China in the World and ASEAN.  33
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